Abstract-Independent regulatory authorities are a basic prerequisite for a successful liberalization process. However, contrary to what is expected, a first glimpse at a small sample of electricity and gas regulators operating in 16 European countries reveals a negative relationship between their formal autonomy from politicians and the scope of market reforms. These findings might suffer from endogeneity, though, so we draw on political scientists' explanations for diverging independence levels to construct appropriate instruments. The 2SLS-results then confirm conventional wisdom: the higher the degree of regulatory autonomy, the higher the level of liberalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The liberalization process initiated by the European Union in electricity and gas markets in the mid-1990s has aimed at achieving a single internal energy market [1] , [2] . It was accompanied by the establishment of national independent regulatory authorities (IRAs) which foster reform by fulfilling three different tasks: first, they allow protection of investors from arbitrary regulatory interferences by governments triggered by short-term political pressures. Second, they monitor the natural monopolies that exist in both industries (i.e., transmission and distribution in both sectors as well as gas storage) to avoid competition-hampering impacts on the liberalized stages (i.e., generation/production, wholesale and retail). This prevents the monopolists from abusing their market power at the expense of consumers. Finally, IRAs are commissioned to enhance economic efficiency [3] , [4] .
Apart from adequate financial and personal resources for the authority, a basic prerequisite for an effective regulation is the total independence from politics and stakeholders [4] . This notion, however, is challenged by the scatterplot shown in figure 1 : the diagram contrasts the degree of regulatory independence with the liberalization level realized in European energy markets; it includes three (for electricity) and two (for gas) years, respectively, of the early 2000s as well as 16 countries (EU-15 plus Norway). The regulators' autonomy is measured by an index developed by Gilardi [5] that ranges from 0 to 1 and increases with higher degrees of formal (i.e., statutory) independence. Liberalization is operationalized by averaging OECD measures that evaluate market entry regulation, vertical separation provisions (in both sectors) and the market structure (only in the gas sector) by assigning values between 6 (precluding competition) and 0 (fostering competition) [6] , [7] 1 . Contrary to what is expected, the fitted regression line in the plot suggests lower reform efforts in energy markets supervised by more autonomous authorities.
These observations are at odds with the conventional wisdom of competition-enhancing independent regulators. They rather emphasize the relevance of the warning to be found repeatedly in research on IRAs [8] , [9] , [10] : despite the substantial role regulatory authorities (are supposed to) play during reform processes, a comprehensive analysis of their functioning and particularly their actual impact on liberalization is still missing. A lack of long-term data on the agencies' degree of independence is identified to be a major reason for this research gap [8] . As a first step to better understand the relationship between regulatory independence and energy market reforms, we therefore compiled the sample already used to create the scatterplot; it captures the autonomy of the same European electricity and gas authorities in different years.
Since a measure reflecting the degree of a regulator's independence is lacking in economics, we draw on an index developed in political science [5] to use it as a basis for constructing our panel. The indicator was originally employed to verify two explanations for diverging degrees of agency autonomy prevailing in this field: the credibility and the uncertainty hypothesis. The former states that the political discretion of governments along with their propensity to optimally adapt their policies to actual circumstances (including those being socially suboptimal but, after the state intervention, worthwhile for causal agents) [11] leaves only one single possibility for ruling parties to credibly commit to their decisions: the establishment of an institutional arrangment that eliminates decisional leeway [12] . The solution considered to be the best in the context of market regulation is the delegation of decision-making powers to agencies [13] which should be fully independent from government to solve the problem effectively [14] , [15] . The uncertainty hypothesis claims that ruling politicians set up autonomous authorities to shield their political beliefs from opposing successors in case they lose majority: established with objectives that reflect the government's ends, their institutional structures durably resistant against any interference secure an adamant policy in the agencies' jurisdictions [16] . Both the explanations are validated empirically in [5] and [17] 2 , applying the autonomy index Gilardi developed in [5] . Additionally, the studies confirm the conjecture that a comprehensive system of checks and balances reduces the power holders' willingness to provide authorities with independence; the necessities to credibly rule out antiindustry changes of statutory provisions and to preserve these rules from warring politicians are assumed to be satisfied by the difficulty to amend or repeal laws associated with a high number of veto players [19] . However, also Gilardi's [5] measure suffers from the problem already mentioned: it merely depicts "a snapshot of the formal independence of regulatory agencies" [8: p. 206 ], covering only a single observation time point. We therefore use the information included in two surveys on European energy regulators [20] , [21] along with Gilardi's [5] method of calculation to compute comparable autonomy index values for further years; this finally allows for an empirical investigation of the effect IRAs have on the scope of electricity and gas market reforms in Europe over a longer period of time.
In the analysis, we use 2SLS IV as estimation method, taking account of the reverse causality problem that might exist: due to the conventional wisdom regarding the liberalizationenhancing effect of authority independence, it is possible that poor reform progress in the energy sector induces a government to extend the responsible regulator's autonomy. Instrumental variables are selected on the basis of the abovementioned findings on the determinants of formal regulatory independence: we employ both a measure for political uncertainty and for political constraints, being, as postestimation 2 While [5] concentrates on testing the credibility hypothesis, [17] , deploying an extended sample, surveys both the credibility and the uncertainty hypothesis. Beyond that, also [18] finds evidence for the validity of the two hypotheses; it re-estimates the empirical model from [17] after refining the procedure used in [5] to determine a regulator's degree of formal independence.
tests suggest, valid instruments for our regression. Moreover, proxies for several factors that have been identified to affect a country's degree of liberalization in previous studies are included as controls. In line with previous research, first stage results then reveal the formal regulatory independence to increase with a high replacement risk for governments and weak veto players; the second stage outcome suggest a considerable liberalization-enhancing effect of an authority's formal independence. Being at odds with the scatterplot, it supports conventional wisdom and gives rise to the conjecture that an interaction between the scope of reform and the statutory level of regulatory autonomy (and hence an endogeneity problem) indeed exists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the estimation method and the data we use to test the hypothesis of a liberalization-enhancing effect of IRAs empirically; it also elucidates the potential reverse causality problem and elaborates on appropriate instruments for regulatory independence to solve it. In section III, the IV regression results are reported and discussed. Section IV illustrates our findings on the basis of a cross-country comparison between Sweden and France. Section V concludes.
II. ESTIMATION METHOD AND DATA

A. Estimation Method
Calls for the establishment and strengthening of IRAs to foster liberalization in the energy sector are characterized by the assumption of an unambiguous direction of effect: the level of formal independence (co-)determines the scope of electricity and gas market reforms in Europe. This requires that a regulatory institution's autonomy is specified before the authority takes up its work; an order that is also stated in the description of the regulatory supply chain in [22] : according to this sequence, the definition of the regulator's independence level from regulatees and politicians stands at the beginning (together with the setting of objectives), whereas regulatory activities are located at the end of the chain, only followed by potential appeals of the authority's decisions. Since, in addition, the advancement of market-oriented reforms is one of the broad goals of independent regulators and the establishment of the latter is vital for the development and preservation of competitive energy makets [3] , assuming that liberalization efforts are influenced by the degree of institutional autonomy seems to be reasonable.
However, some statements in [3] also allow a different conclusion, thus challenging the causality's unambiguity: they postulate a linkage between regulatory institutions and the sectoral structure that makes a consistency of both fields inevitable. But in order to reach the latter not the market reacts; rather regulators are adapted to structural changes previously induced by liberalization measures. Then, the increased competition prevailing after reform requires an impartial decisionmaker not discriminating against any of the market players, entailing the establishment of independent regulatory bodies [3] . Additionally, also one of the reasons adduced at the beginning of the Third Electricity Directive [23] Consequently, we cannot rule out that the relationship suggested by the scatterplot suffers seriously from endogeneity caused by reverse causality. We tackle this problem by applying an instrumental variable approach, estimating the following equations:
The first equation describes the first-stage estimation, where the formal independence of regulators is regressed on the instruments, Z it . The second one captures the second-stage, estimating the effect of formal independence on the degree of liberalization. X it is the vector of covariates.
B. Measuring Liberalization
To capture the degree of liberalization in national electricity and gas markets, we draw on the OECD's ETCR (Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation) index [7] . It provides a comparative measure for the overall liberalization level in seven non-manufacturing sectors (electricity, gas, airlines, railways, road transport, post, telecommunications) by assessing how regulatory provisions impede competition in the potentially competitive stages of the industries' value chains. The comprehensive measure is composed of the (equally weighted) sector indicator values which, in turn, are the averaged scores of two to four so-called sub-indicators. The latter capture the regulatory design in two to four areas that are crucial for realizing a competitive market in the industry considered and are chosen from the following: barriers to entry, public ownership, market structure, vertical integration and price controls. Two or three main aspects of the structural arrangements in each of the selected fields are then evaluated on the basis of data included in OECD and other institutions' official publications as well as information on policy settings and regulatory rules gathered from OECD member states by a questionnaire [6] .
Since we are interested in a possible relationship between regulatory independence and liberalization in the energy sector, we concentrate on the electricity and the gas sector indicators in the following. The sub-indicators originally included are entry regulation, public ownership and vertical integration (both sectors) as well as the market structure (only for the gas sector) [6] . Due to reverse causality concerns, however, we decided to disregard the ownership situation. According to [25] , the market power of natural monopolies existing in European energy markets has been curbed for a long time by nationalization. This approach aimed at ensuring an appropriate consideration of the public interest in the companies' production and pricing decisions, but was increasingly perceived as failing to meet this objective: apart from the insufficient supervision of the firms' leaders due to a lack of specialist knowledge and information on the side of politicians, vague responsibilities and managerial objectives prevented clear-cut performance ratings and enabled executives either to excessively expand corporate activities or to preserve convenient conditions. In the recent past, independent authorities have therefore taken over the regulatory function from public ownership. To measure the liberalization levels in gas and electricity markets, we calculate the respective mean of the subindicator values remaining for each sector. To obtain the latter, the following major aspects are evaluated: the electricity entry regulation sub-indicator captures the conditions of third party access, the existence of a wholesale market and restrictions in the consumers' choice of supplier, the vertical integration sub-indicator considers the level of vertical separation between transmission and generation as well as the overall degree of vertical integration in the sector. The gas entry regulation subindicator analyzes the terms of third party access, the extent of consumer choice and provisions curtailing market entry in the production/import stage, the vertical integration subindicator assesses the degree of vertical seperation between production/import and all residual stages, between supply and all residual stages and separately between supply and distribution. The market structure sub-indicator for the gas sector additionally evaluates the largest companies' market shares in the production/import, in the transmission and in the supply stage. Evaluation scores assigned to each of these issues range from 0 to 6 and increase with the anticompetitiveness of regulatory provisions. A weighting scheme adding up to 100 percent is then applied to all scores belonging to one subindicator, yielding index values between 0 and 6 for both the latter [6] and our liberalization measure.
C. Measuring Formal Independence
To measure the autonomy of energy regulators, the index of formal independence developed by Gilardi [5] is applied as a benchmark. An authority's formal independence determines the degree of autonomy conceded to an IRA by statutes and laws that prohibit political interventions [5] . It has to be distinguished from an agency's de facto independence [8] which captures the non-interference in an authority's day-today operations and is conceptualized as well as separately operationalized in [9] . Unlike the formal independence concept, the de facto approach consideres the autonomy from both politicians and regulatees. Gilardi's [5] index comprises five dimensions determining a regulator's formal autonomy: the agency head's status, the management board members' status, the authority's relationship with government and parliament, the regulator's financial and organizational autonomy and the regulatory competencies. The degree of independence in these areas is assessed by a questionnaire answered by regulators and displayed in [5] , [17] and [26] . It assigns values between 0 and 1 to predefined answering possibilities to questions that capture the statutory provisions governing the respective aspect surveyed. The values increase when political interference is impeded by the relevant laws. The dimension indices are the average values of all questions composing a dimension; the overall autonomy values used in our paper are calculated as the mean of the dimensions. Figures for the dimensions as well as the total independence of electricity regulators are reported in detail in [26] .
Since we are particularly interested in possible effects of regulatory independence on liberalization over time, we extended the observation period by including two additional surveys [20] , [21] . Since both reports draw on similar questionnaires as [5] to picture the formal autonomy of IRAs, constructing a small sample that captures the formal independence of energy regulators in 16 European countries (EU-15 plus Norway) in the recent past was possible: All answers were coded according to Gilardi's [5] scale, so as to generate a comparable measure for the independence dimensions and the overall IRA autonomy. Unlike [5] , [17] and [26] , which explicitly refer to electricity regulators, both [20] and [21] survey the member authorities of the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), being responsible for energy regulation. For the periods covered by [20] and [21] , we therefore consider both the electricity and the gas sector. The regulator in Norway constitutes an exception: it is not responsible for governing the gas market [27] , so that only the Norwegian electricity sector is included in our analysis.
D. Instrumental Variables
When choosing the instruments included in Z it , we draw on the findings from political science. On the one hand, we construct a measure for political imponderability, uncert. Based on the uncertainty hypothesis, it aims at capturing the potential effect of a government's replacement risk on the authority's formal independence. On the other hand, the veto player index polcon3 allows for checks and balances in the political process and the associated alleviation of the uncertainty and the credibility problem suggested by theory. A separate measure to take account of a government's credibility is not incorporated as an instrument. Previous studies substantiated the credibility hypothesis by revealing authorities to be formally more independent in economic compared to social [5] and in utility compared to competition, financial and social regulation [17] , [18] , respectively. The findings are thus based on a rather rough classification, aggregating electricity, telecommunications and once (in [5] ) even financial regulators. Given the similarities between electricity and gas markets, this pooling indirectly also implies identical credibility requirements in both these industries. To avoid deviations from the approach continously applied before, we therefore refrain form adding an additional instrument that captures the importance of a government's trustworthiness for statutory regulatory independence.
The calculation of our index for a governments' replacement risk, uncert, resembles the method Gilardi [17] applies to construct his political uncertainty measure. His scale, also used in [18] , captures two different aspects: First, a government's hazard of losing office. Always related to the respective cabinet governing at the time of observation, it is measured by the reciprocal of the number of years between taking and being voted out of office. Second, the changes in the ruling parties' political orientation. They are operationalized by the standard deviation of yearly values rating the overall ideology of both government and parliament. To get the annual values, scores ranging from 1 (for right-wingers) to 5 (for left-wingers) are assigned to each party represented in these two policital institutions and then weighted according to their share of total seats. The period the standard deviation relates to ranges from five years before the year of observation to the one following. In the end, both values are multiplied, so that higher values stand for a higher risk of being replaced by a succeeding government with a diverging political ideology [17] , [26] .
To calculate our index, we draw on three variables (gov new, elec and gov gap) from the Comparative Political Data Set I compiled by Armingeon et al. [36] , [37] . During computation, both the main aspects mentioned above are incorporated, but the measure exhibits some differences, nevertheless: On the one hand, we refrain from including future years, querying that governments really have perfect foresight. Twelve month before voting, election results are often entirely ambiguous. On the other hand, we extend the period of observation to 25 years (i.e., 24 years back), mainly due to our simpler measure of a government's risk of losing office that requires a longer time span to reveal variations. We assess a cabinet's probability of being substituted by a successor with different political ideas as follows: we divide the number of government ideology changes induced by variations in the parties holding office (gov new) by the total number of elections (addition of all entries for elec) in the period defined. Ideology changes are identified on the basis of an index that assigns integral values according to the political orientation of governing parties: a value of 1 is assigned when only right-wing or centre politicians are in the government, a value of 2 when less than 33% of the cabinet members are from left-wing parties and the measure takes a value of 3 when the left-wing share further increases up to less than 66%. Values of 4 and 5 describe the opposite to values of 2 and 1 with an analogous dominance of left-wing parties. Whenever the index value switches compared to the previous year, an ideology change has occured. The fraction is then multiplied by the overall scope of the ruling governments' ideology changes in the last 25 years by summing up the absolute values of gov gap. Gov gap also draws on the ideology index and calculates the governments' ideology difference by subtracting the pre-from the post-replacement index value. For each index part multiplied, an increase illustrates a higher threat of an ideological turnaround, so the same holds for the entire uncertainty measure.
The values for polcon3 are taken over one-to-one from the identically named measure included in Henisz's Political Constraints Index Dataset [38] . It surveys whether beyond an executive also a higher and a lower house of a legislature exist in a country and, if so, to which extent the political orientations of the different institutions' members diverge. Calculated on the basis of these polity features, the index then reflects an institutional player's difficulties to realize policy changes that are caused by supporters of opposing ideologies holding seats in institutions with veto power [39] . In research on IRAs, polcon3 is a common measure to capture the effects of checks and balances: as a component of a more comprehensive index, it is used in [17] and [18] to survey the theoretically predicted negative effect of veto players on formal regulatory independence; in a robustness check, [17] also employs the unmodified measure.
In more detail, polcon3 is constructed as follows [39] , [40] : as a first step, the probability that two randomly selected delegates are members of the same party is assessed for each existing chamber of the legislature; it is expressed as a value between 0 and 1 3 . The legislative strength of the party that controls the executive then decides on how to proceed: whenever a chamber of the legislature is dominated by this party as well, the original probability is used in further calculations; for each chamber that is controlled by the opposition, on the contrary, the probability is substracted from 1. This leads to values that consistently increase with a house's likelihood to veto the executive. To get the final polcon3 values, the (modified) probability/-ies is/are then multiplied with a weighting factor: in case of only one legislative chamber, the factor amounts to 2/3; in case of two chambers, the mean of the (modified) probabilities is multiplied by 4/5. If no legislature exists at all, the polcon3 value is 0. Higher index values thus indicate higher hurdles for a political institution to enforce its plans; we therefore expect a negative coefficient for our second instrument.
E. Control Variables
Although studies assessing the impact of regulatory independence on energy market liberalization are lacking, some other explanations for diverging reform efforts have been suggested by empiricists. Their findings as well as the operationalization we applied to control for their results in our estimations are briefly introduced in the following. In addition, the inclusion of further controls is substantiated. 3 To calculate the probabilty, the formula 1 − n i=1
n determines the total number of parties represented in the respective chamber, N the house's total number of seats and n i the number of seats in this chamber held by party i [39] .
First, we add a sector dummy to differentiate between regulatory activities in the electricity and the gas sector. It takes a value of 1 for regulators governing the gas branch. Given that, compared to electricity, reform efforts in gas markets were smaller in the early years of liberalization [6] leading to distinct initial situations for gas and electricity regulators just established, a positive sign is likely to occur.
We also include the regulator's age. The duration of its activity most likey plays an important role for the fulfillment of its (economic) task to eliminate anti-competitive behavior in the electricity and gas sector, respectively. Hence, a negative coefficient sign on the number of years passed by since an authority's start of operation is expected.
Reference [28] finds out that -compared to a situation without an economic crisis -liberalization efforts (inter alia measured by the design of regulatory provisions) are higher in countries suffering from a deep growth crisis, whereas a medium crisis delays steps of reform 4 . Reference [29] refines the analysis by examining the joint effect of a country's economic performance and its political regime type and shows that a liberalization-enhancing effect of negative growth arises in democracies, but not in autocratic polities. His results hold independent of the crisis' severity. We control for potential effects of economic downturns by including a lagged crisis dummy: It takes a value of 1 when the real GDP per capita growth rate of the previous year was negative. Based on the findings in [28] , rather a positive sign is anticipated, since in the period considered a deep recession did not emerge in European states. The results in [29] , however, suggest a negative sign.
Additionally, we take account of a country's energy efficiency in production. Since it is reasonable to assume that a greater desire for cheap energy prevails in economies with energy-intense manufacturing processes, a high energy intensity probably fosters competitive market structures in the national electricity and gas industry. We therefore rescale a common proxy for energy efficiency, the total primary energy supply per thousand US$ of GDP [30] , by multiplying it with 1000 and include it in our regression with a lag of one year. Based on our remarks, we anticipate a negative coefficient.
Reference [31] analyzes the influence of a government's ideology on the intensity of liberalization, employing the aggregate ETCR indicator to measure the latter. It identifies greater reform efforts in countries with right-wing governments. We therefore control for the political orientation by adding Potrafke's [32] ideology index. It takes values between 1 and 5 and is reduced with the share of government seats right-wing parties hold: a value of 1 is assigned if more than 2/3 of all positions are staffed by right-wing partisans, a value of 2 if this share lies between 1/3 and 2/3. The measure takes a value of 3 when centre party members fill half of the positions or a balanced coalition of right-and left-wing parties governs. Values of 4 and 5 correspond to the situations described for 2 and 1 with left-wing parties holding the respective shares. Accordingly, a positive sign is expected.
Finally, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) [33] is included. It captures the perceived susceptibility to bribery of a country's public sector and ranges from 0 (high degree of corruption) to 10 (no corruption). The indicator is based on answers to polls conducted by various proficient institutions and captures opinions about briberies, irregularities in public procurement, misappropriation of public funds as well as anti-corruption measures. The questions relate to public officials, civil servants and politicians. Reference [34] applies this measure to show that in the EU-15 the degree of vertical separation between electricity transmission and generationan essential condition to realize fully liberalized markets [35] -is higher in less corrupt member states. Hence, we conjecture a negative coefficient to occur.
Research furthermore suggests that besides the polity features employed as instruments also two aspects captured by covariates might affect a regulator's formal independence: given Bernstein's theory on the life cycle of regulatory commissions [41] , we first expect the authority's age to do so. The approach divides the regulator's duration in four phases (gestation, youth, maturity and old age) and describes the agency's decline from a publicly desired, ambitious institution to a useless, self-perpetuating social burden just aiming at defending its status quo. The increasing failure to fulfil its regulatory task associated with this development is assumed to entail an incremental evaporation of the political succor initially existing, implying a lack of both content-related leadership and financial support. However, although the emerging situation is rated as negative (especially since a simultaneous adoption of industrial interests by the idle authority is expected to occur), the isolation from politics should correspond to a higher autonomy level within the context of Gilardi's [5] independence index; a positive IRA age coefficient would thus be reasonable.
Second, also the ruling party's ideology might influence the energy authorities' statutory autonomy: expecting that compared to left-wing governments right-wing cabinets are more strongly inclined to install IRAs in the course of liberalization due to the close proximity between the conservatives' market orientation and the agencies' conventional mission, [42] , a survey on the proliferation determinants of independent agencies in Western Europe, finds the exact opposite. The explanation for this surprising result draws on [12] and [43] which argue that a party professing to aim at a situation conflicting with its political preferences lacks credibility: since a left-wing government's will to liberalize might be challenged, it more urgently needs to establish an autonomous institution promoting reforms to signal serious intentions than a rightwing counterpart [26] . Transferred to existing authorities, in turn, this would imply that left-wing cabinets have to provide regulators with a higher level of formal independence to Note: Table I shows first-stage estimation results from a 2SLS IV regression. Dependent variable is the autonomy level of electricity and gas regulators, respectively, as measured on the basis of Gilardi's [5] formal independence index. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
credibly commit; we therefore expect a positive sign on the ideology index coefficient in the first stage. Table I shows the first stage results with robust standard errors being clustered at the country level. The statistically highly significant coefficient of our uncertainty measure substantiates the theory from political science: for our sample, a higher threat of being voted out of government is related to an increase in formal independence from politics. The notion of regulatory authorities to be bulkwarks against policy turnarounds induced by opponent successors thus seems to be reasonable. However, the size of the effect suggested by the results is rather minor: if we assume elections to take place every four years (i.e., six polls are included in the measure, neglecting years immediately after votings in the following) as well as governments to change from left-wing to right-wing dominated cabinets and back after every second election, the independence value raises by not even 0.04.
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Something similar is also true for our second instrument: its coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level, corroborating the theoretical prediction that increasing powers of veto players reduce the independence of regulatory authorities. The size of the suggested effect, however, is small again, as the following example illustrates: consider a two-party political system in which two legislative chambers with 99 seats each exist besides the executive. Assume that initially 2/3 of the delegates in both houses are members of the governing party. The coefficient on the veto player measure now suggests that an election resulting in a reversal of the majorities in one chamber (so that the opposition holds 2/3 of the seats there) reduces the autonomy index by less than 0.03. Particularly because of the dual role checks and balances (are supposed to) play by simultaneously alleviating both the uncertainty and the credibility problem, this minor impact is rather surprising.
Apart from our instruments also some covariates reach statistical significance. The gas dummy is significant at the 5% level and hints at a small independence gap between electricity and gas market regulators in favor of the latter. This could be explained by the credibility hypothesis: the categorization of authorities applied in previous empirical studies aggregates all utility sectors and might thus ignore divergences in the credibility requirements possibly existing between the particular markets. Compared to electricity investments, various gas infrastructure projects are considerably larger because of the huge distances between production and consumption sites. Since their realization necessitates a secure rate of return, a demand for a higher security level might prevail in this industry. This, in turn, could be met by the establishment of a more independent regulator. However, the coefficient's negligible size indicates the aggregating measure applied in other surveys to be adequately precise.
The negative and highly significant IRA age coefficient contradicts our considerations on the effect the (alleged) deteriorating performance of an authority throughout its life cycle has on its formal autonomy. To explain this rather surprising result, one could -at variance with the original concept -argue as follows: Due to the exceptional importance of electricity and gas for the economic development of a country (and thus for a ruling party's reelection chances), the government might try to prevent the industry from capturing the supervising authority by gradually curtailing its initial autonomy from politics. The results in [9] for the banking and the telecommunications sector support this reasoning: the study reveals that if a relationship between the sector regulators' de facto independences from politicians and from regulatees exists, it is negative, whereas the relationship between de facto and formal independence from politicians (if any) is positive. Transferring this to the energy sector, it is not unreasonable to assume that a government tries to shield the authority's day-to-day operations from the increasing interference of the industry by broadening the cabinet's influence again. According to the coefficient, a fully independent regulatory authority would have forfeited all of its autonomy after about 38 and a half years. The significant energy efficiency covariate is indicative of the dilemma governments might finally end up in: on the one hand, they might try to stem adverse industrial influences on the monitoring body by gradually reducing the authority's independence; on the other hand, however, they are interested in cheap electricity and gas supplies for the economy. Since this aim becomes ever more important with increasingly energy-intensive production processes, a higher lagged energy usage per unit of GDP apparently induces power holders to establish more autonomous regulators: they are deemed to foster competition and thus to reduce prices. All remaining controls do not reach statistical significance.
Second stage results are reported in table II; standard errors are again robust and clustered at the country level. The coefficient of the instrumented formal independence of energy regulators is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting a strong effect of a higher statutory autonomy from politicians on a country's reforms efforts: according Note: Table II shows second-stage estimation results from a 2SLS IV regression. Dependent variable is the mean of the electricity and gas sector sub-indicators, respectively, apart from public ownership, as described in [6] . Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***/** denotes significance at the 1%/5% level.
to the second stage outcome, the establishment of a fully autonomous authority reduces the liberalization measure by slightly more than 4.5, i.e. by approximately three quarters of its maximum value. For existing regulators, this means that if one of the regulatory dimensions is still under complete control of the government, the latter can initiate steps of reform corresponding to almost one index unit by granting total autonomy to the authority in this domain.
Both the statistically highly significant covariates show the expected sign: they reveal a slower liberalization pace in gas compared to electricity markets as well as a positive relationship between long-lasting IRA activities and the intensity of competition in energy sectors. According to their size, the modest reform efforts in the gas sector earlier in time entail a liberalization divergence which is equivalent to about two OECD index units. Furthermore, every three years of regulatory surveillance reduce the liberalization measure by one unit.
Finally, we run postestimation tests to address two crucial issues that arise when instrumental variables are applied: the appropriateness of the IV approach and the validity of the instruments employed [44] . We apply the robustified DurbinWu-Hausman test [45] , [46] , [47] to analyze whether our instrumented variable is indeed endogenous, making the use of instrumental variables necessary. The null hypothesis is that our regressor of the regulators' formal independence is exogenous [44] . For our sample, it is rejected at the 5%-level (p = 0.0154), fully justifying an application of the IV approach at this point. In addition, we run Hansen's J statistic chisquared test [48] to ascertain the validity of the overidentifying instruments in our (overidentified) model. The null hypothesis claims that all instruments are uncorrelated with the residual, so that its rejection implies at least one invalid instrument [44] . The test yields a p-value of 0.7812, suggesting the validity of the instruments applied on the basis of the uncertainty hypothesis and the presumed function of veto players.
IV. CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS: EXAMPLE
In the following, we want to illustrate our findings on the basis of a cross-country comparison: applying the Swedish Energy Agency (STEM) as a benchmark, we contrast it with the French Commission de Régulation de l'Energie (CRE) to demonstrate the relationship between the agencies' formal independence and the degree of electricity market liberalization in both countries. We consider the situation that was prevailing in the last year included in our sample (2005), thus drawing only on information included in [21] when discussing the provisions enacted to restrict political interference. Furthermore, we simplify our analysis by concentrating on the statistically significant second-stage regressors.
In 2005, the Swedish electricity sector was almost completely liberalized: a free market entry was secured by a regulated third party access to the transmission grid, the existence of a wholesale market and the free choice of supplier for all consumers, regardless of their yearly power consumption; for this year, the entry regulation sub-indicator thus equals 0. Beyond that, also the vertical separation between generation and transmission companies was completed. However, since ownership unbundling was only enforced between these two activities, the integration of generators and transmission firms with wholesale traders, distribution companies and retailers as well as linkages of these three types of market players with each other partially persisted. As a consequence, a value of 0 was assigned for the unbundling level between generation and transmission, but only a value of 3 for the incomplete overall separation of the industry. Calculated as the mean of both these scores, the vertical integration sub-indicator equals 1.5 [7] , while our dependent variable, averaging the two subindicators, takes a value of 0.75.
According to [7] , the STEM was established two years earlier than its French counterpart CRE. Based on the age coefficient in table II, one could hence expect the liberalization proxy for France to exceed the Swedish benchmark score by appoximately 0.7. But instead of taking a value of about 1.45, the dependent variable reflecting the French electricity market regulation is about half an index unit lower: diverging from the regulatory environment in Sweden only with respect to the existence of a consumption threshold that excluded small consumers from the free choice of supplier, it takes a value of nearly 0.92 (due to the threshold, the score capturing this aspect is increased to 1; the market entry sub-indicator then yields a value of about 0.33 and the liberalization proxy is the average of 1.5 and 0.33, the two sub-indicator scores) [7] .
The regression results suggest that the CRE's higher degree of formal independence was the main reason for offsetting the age-related lag of reform that was to be expected: with the autonomy index value of the French agency exceeding that of the STEM by 0.16, the second-stage coefficient of our instrumented variable implies that the more effective protection from political interference in France induced an additional reduction of the liberalization proxy of slightly more than 0.7 units. The 2005 value of 0.92 reported for France in [7] and the liberalization score we predicted by our simplified comparison thus only deviate by about 0.17 units.
A closer look at the numerous aspects that determine an authority's overall level of formal independence according to [5] then reveals that apparently stricter provisions with respect to the regulators' autonomy and the agency's relationship with government and parliament helped to better ward off political interference in France. This, in turn, probably resulted in a liberalization-enhancing effect: regulatees are assumed to interfere with authorities mostly only indirectly via politicians who are prone to yield to political pressures and are therefore exploited by suppliers as well as industrial lobbyists [49] ; the better protection of the French authority from such delegates should accordingly have more effectively prevented that regulation is biased in favor of dominating market players. In the following, we bring out the main differences in the statutory provisions determining the independence of the CRE and the STEM to identify the channels that Swedish politicians might have used to delay reform in comparison to France. Aspects of formal autonomy that are governed by identical or similar rules in both countries are neglected at this point due to space limitations; they should not have affected national regulation very differently.
The Swedish executive's appointment power posed the first threat to the STEM's autonomy: whereas in France the President as well as the presidents of both houses of the bicameral parliament and of the Economic and Social Council (a consultative body) were empowered to choose one or two of seven regulators in total each, it was an exclusive competence of the government in Sweden [21] . Such a decision-making monopoly makes it easy for power holders to place confidants in the authority which allow for their patrons' will when they take action; the danger of that happening was especially serious in Sweden, since in 2005 there was only a single regulator working for the STEM [21] . The mutual control of the different institutions' representatives induced by the French provisions, on the contrary, made any form of political interference rather difficult.
The influence of the Swedish government on regulatory decisions was further facilitated by the rules on secondary employment: specific stipulations prohibiting STEM employees to simultaneously work for the government did not exist, neglecting the risk of close ties between regulators and ruling politicians to develop; French regulators were subject to rigorous restrictions [21] .
The Swedish statutes also led to a higher dependency of agency decision makers on the government: unlike in France, where reappointments of regulators were ruled out, additional terms of the STEM regulator were possible [21] . Since a chance to keep the job might induce authority members to shrink from implementing regulations that conflict with the government's interests, provisions admitting reappointments are rated as restricting an agency's autonomy [3] , [26] .
Finally, also the Swedish appeal procedure for regulatory decisions limited the independence of the STEM: whereas all rulings of the French CRE could only be contested in court, the Swedish provisions assigned the authority to overturn decisions in some regulatory domains to the government [21] .
V. CONCLUSION
Contradicting the (apparently erroneous) first impression created by the scatterplot neglecting the reverse causality problem, the IV estimation corroborates the conventional wisdom on the effect of regulatory independence: for our sample of EU energy regulators, a higher statutory autonomy from politics entails a higher liberalization level of electricity and gas markets. The European legislator's demand for an enhanced protection of regulatory authorities from government interferences is thus both justified and reasonable.
However, although our study is a helpful contribution to the understanding of long-term effects of independent regulatory authorities on energy market liberalization, it is obviously just a first step: in particular, a more comprehensive data set comprising information on the agencies' formal autonomy in additional years would be desirable. Likewise, panel data on the authorities' level of de facto independence from both politicians and regulatees would be useful; only the inclusion of these two dimensions of autonomy would allow for a complete and profound analysis of the impact of IRAs on the intensity of reform.
